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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXCLUSIONARY RULE OF IMapp v.
Ohio HELD NOT TO OPERATE RETROACTIVELY UPON CASES
FINALLY DECIDED PRIOR TO MAPP. Linkletter v. Walker (U.S.
1965).
The petitioner, whose conviction in a state court had become final
prior to Mapp v. Ohio,1 attacked the conviction through habeas
corpus proceedings in the federal district court on the ground that
evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure was used against
him at his trial in violation of the rule set forth in Mapp,2 which the
petitioner contended should be applied retroactively.8 The district
court dismissed the writ and the court of appeals affirmed. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari6 to resolve "what has become
a most troublesome question in the administration of justice." The
Court affirmed, holding that the Mapp rule did not operate retro-
actively upon cases finally decided 7 prior to the Mapp case. Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
The Linkletter case sets forth a test8 by which future cases seeking
1 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 The federal exclusionary rule, set forth in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), made inadmissible in federal courts evidence seized by federal officers in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), refused to extend the exclusionary rule to
proceedings in state courts. Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 1, specifically overruled Volt
to the extent that Mapp held that the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the
search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment was required of the states by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
3 For articles concerning retroactivity as applied to overruling decisions, see gen-
erally Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Decision; Mapp v. Ohio, 110
U. PA. L. Rav. 650 (1962); Freund, New Vistas in Constitutional Law, 112 U. PA. L.
Rav. 631 (1964); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J.
317; Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices,
34 RocKY MT. L. Rv. 150 (1962). Compare Currier, Time and Change in Judge-
Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); Meador, Habeas
Corpus and the "Retroactivity Illusion," 50 VA. L. Rar. 1115 (1964); Torica & King,
The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional Concepts, 66 DIcK. L. Rv.
269 (1962). See also Note, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 587 (1962); Notes and Comments,
71 YALE LJ. 907 (1962); 62 MicH. L. REv. 1250 (1964).
4 United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963).
5 Linkletter v. Walker, 377 U.S. 930 (1964).
6 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 620 (1965).
7 Id. at 622 n.5 states: "By final we mean where the judgment of conviction was
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari
had elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio."
8 Though the Court does not cite the major source of its test, it includes much con-
tained in a thorough study made in Notes and Comments, Prospective Overruling and
Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE .J. 907, 940-51 (1962) and
incorporated in the court of appeal's opinion, United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker,
323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963). Before the Court applied the test, it determined that
there were no constitutional nor philosophical impediments to a purely prospective ap-
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retroactive application of a new constitutional rule can expect to
be evaluated. The Court decided it must:
[W]eigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the
prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and
whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.9
Accordingly, the circumstances in Linkletter required that the Court
look to "[1] the purpose of the Ma1pp rule; [2] the reliance placed
upon the Wolf'0 doctrine; and [3] the effect on the administration
of justice of a retrospective application of Mapp."'
The reasoning of the Court, in essence, was that (1) Mapp's
purpose was "the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment through
the inclusion of the exclusionary rule within its rights ... be-
cause this was the only effective deterrent against illegal seizure of
evidence by law enforcement officers;13 (2) the prior history of
Wolf, though modified by several extensions,' 4 had been one of
reliance by both the accused and the states;'" and (3) retroactive
plication of a new constitutional rule. Id. at 628. The Court recognized a suggestion
that it might be prevented by U.S. CONST. art. III from adopting the technique of purely
prospective overruling. But it summarily dismissed this argument by saying that no
doubt of its power was expressed in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Ex-
aminers, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). The Court also cited Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
20-26 (1956) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.). In addition, the Court con-
sidered the academic debate involving the nature of a judicial decision: Blackstone hold-
ing that the judge is but the discoverer of the law as it always was; Austin, Cardozo,
and the "legal realists" arguing that the judge is the creator of the law. A modem
resolution of this debate came in Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940), where Hughes, C.J., found that the actual existence of the
law prior to the determination of unconstitutionality "is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration." Therefore, the Court is not obliged to apply its new con-
stitutional rule retroactively. It must, however, take into consideration the existence of
the former rule. The Court had first recognized the legal realists' theory in Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910) and allowed the states to choose between the
two approaches in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358
(1932). See generally Annot., 85 A.L.R. 262.
9 381 U.S. at 629.
1o Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ; see note 2 supra.
11 381 U.S. at 636.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (function of the ex-
clusionary rule is to deter).
.4 Elkins v. United States, supra note 13 (illegally seized evidence transferred by
state authorities to federal agents held inadmissible in federal prosecutions); Rea v.
United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (illegally seized evidence transferred by federal
agents to state authorities held inadmissible in state court prosecutions); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (evidence obtained by pumping the stomach of the
accused was excluded on the ground that such police methods shocked the conscience
of the Court).
15 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 637. Under Wolf, the victim of illegally
seized evidence could seek damages for invasion of privacy but the state courts could
admit the evidence even though it was the product of an illegal search and seizure.
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application of Mapp would overtax the administration of justice
and retard criminal law enforcement because of the difficulty in
holding hearings on the excludability of evidence which had been
destroyed or misplaced and the unavailability in many cases of wit-
nesses at such hearings. 6 On the basis of these findings, the Court
determined there was no justification for applying the Mapp rule
retroactively.' 7
Does the Linkletter test provide the courts with a workable stan-
dard with which to decide whether new constitutional interpretations
should be applied retroactively? For example, inextricably connected
with the constitutional rights of the accused is the fairness of the
trial."' The Court, in Linkletter, does not specifically undertake a
discussion of the fair trial question, but the opinion does distinguish
the Mapp rule from other new constitutional rules'0 which were
applied retroactively on the basis that they went to the fairness of
the trial. However, it is implicit in the Court's holding that if the
rule in question (i.e., the rule sought to be applied retroactively)
has been promulgated to provide guarantees for the fairness of the
16 Ibid. The Court concluded: "to thus legitimate such an extraordinary procedural
weapon that has no bearing on guilt would seriously disrupt the administration of
justice."
IT The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Black and joined by Mr. Justice Douglas,
would grant the petitioner a retrial because: (1) Miss Mapp's offense was committed
May 23, 1957, while Linkletter's offense occurred August 16, 1958, and "there is no
experience of the past that justifies a new Court-made rule to perpetuate a grossly in-
vidious and unfair discrimination against Linkletter simply because he happened to be
prosecuted in a State that was evidently well up with its criminal court docket." Id. at
642; (2) there was a constitutional right involved rather than a mere effort to deter
police officers; (3) Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), opened up to collateral attack
in federal courts all unconstitutional state convictions even though "final."
18 In Linkletter the Court equates "fair trial" with ensuring the "integrity of the
fact-finding process." 381 U.S. at 639. Thus, as Linkleiter points out, the admission into
evidence of a coerced confession, because of its inherent unreliability and untrustworthi.
ness, infringes upon the integrity of the fact-finding process, denying the accused a fair
trial. As opposed to the coerced confession, illegally seized tangible evidence is not
untrustworthy, and its admission into evidence does not contaminate the fact-finding
process. Admission of this tangible evidence is prejudicial in the sense that it constitutes
more evidence against the accused, but it is not prejudicial in the sense that it is none-
theless reliable. Therefore, because of the trustworthiness of this kind of evidence, the
accused has not been denied a fair trial when the criteria for defining "fair trial" are
limited to those elements affecting the integrity of the fact-finding process.
19 In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), where the New York procedure con-
cerning voluntariness of a confession had left the ultimate determination to the jury
regardless of the circumstances, the Court stated it failed to assure the defendant a fair
determination of voluntariness and contaminated the whole trial. In Gideon v. Wain.
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), where the indigent defendant had been refused counsel,
the Court stated it rendered the judgment unreliable because the layman could not pos-
sibly provide an adequate defense. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), where
the defendant had been precluded from taking an appeal because of his inability to pay
for a transcript of the trial, the Court stated it was tantamount to denying a fair trial
to the poor.
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trial, the courts should apply the rule retroactively.20 If the issue
of fair trial is not inherent in the rule in question, then the Linkletter
test should be applied, by weighing the merits and demerits of the
three elements in order to arrive at a conclusion as to retroactive
application.
The viability of the Linkletter test will become manifest in the
near future. At present the retroactivity of Escobedo v. Illinois1 and
Griffin v. California 2  is being determined by several courts.2 3 The
Escobedo rule requires a suspect to be informed of his right to coun-
sel and his right to remain silent at the accusatory stage of the crim-
inal investigation. 4 The Griffin rule would make it reversible error
20 Cases cited note 19 supra. These cases and the subsequent cases applying their
rules retroactively, all decided prior to Linkletter, seem to suggest that as soon as the
Court finds that the defendant has been denied a fair trial, the rule in question should
be applied retroactively.
21 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
22 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
23 United States ex rel. Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965) ; Carrizosa
v. Wilson, 244 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1965); Hayes v. United States, 236 F. Supp.
225 (B.D. Mo. 1964); In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 398 P.2d 380, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188
(1965); Ruark v. People, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2213-14 (Colo. Sept. 13, 1965); Bell v.
State, Fla. 175 So. 2d 80 (1965); Commonwealth v. Negri, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2186
(Pa. Sept. 29, 1965); State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737 (1964); People v.
Honanian, 22 App. Div. 2d 686, 253 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1964) (Escobedo rule applied
prospectively). United States ex re. Walker v. Fogliani, 343 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965) ;
Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1964) (dicta); Fugate v. Ellenson, 237
F. Supp. 44 (Neb. 1964); Galara Cruz v. Delgado, 233 F. Supp. 944 (P.R. 1964)
(Escobedo rule applied retroactively).
In re Gaines, 63 Adv. Cal. 235, 404 P.2d 473, 45 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1965); Pinch
v. Maxwell, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2190 (Ohio Sept. 29, 1965) (Griffin rule applied
prospectively).
24 The holding in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 490-91, is as follows: "We hold,
therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been
taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied
an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied
'the Assistance of counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as'made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. at 342, and that no statement elicited by the police during the inter-
rogation may be used against him at a criminal trial." The problem of retroactive
application of the Escobedo rule is compounded by the vexing question as to whether
right to counsel at the accusatory stage depends on a request for counsel. In the
Escobedo case the accused made the request; therefore, that opinion affords no certain
guide. In addition, authority is split as to whether the request is necessary. United
States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965) (request not neces-
sary) ; United States v. Chidress, 347 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1965) (request necessary).
Further confusion resulted when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case where
the state court had held request necessary, People v. Hargraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202
N.E.2d 33 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965), and also in a case where the
state court had held request unnecessary, People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d
361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 946 (1965).
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for the prosecutor to comment or the judge to instruct the jury re-
garding the defendant's refusal to testify.
2
5
In assessing the merit of the Linkletter test it is imperative to
determine how the Court will dispose of the fair trial question in
cases urging the retroactive application of the Escobedo and Griffin
rules. When the Escobedo rule is sought to be applied retroactively, 2
the Court could possibly conclude that providing the defendant a
fair trial was not inherent in the rule.27 It is strongly argued that
the purpose of Escobedo is to "discourage oppressive police prac-
tices,' 28 rather than to provide a fair trial, and therefore the rule
should not be applied retroactively.2 However, it could be argued
that the purpose of the Escobedo rule is to eliminate pretrial in-
criminating statements which otherwise might be used to impeach
or prejudice the defendant at trial and this would go directly to the
25 The retroactive application of the Grifn rule currently is up for argument.
United States ex rel. Shott v. Tehan, 337 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 381
U.S. 923 (1965).
26 The retroactive application of the Escobedo rule currently is up for argument.
State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737 (1964), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. WEK
3183 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1965).
27 If "fair trial" is equated with ensuring the "integrity of the fact-finding process,"
then in the Escobedo situation the question becomes whether the admission (or con-
fession) at the accusatory stage without advice of counsel or without being told of the
right to remain silent is so untrustworthy or unreliable that its admission into evidence
impinges upon the integrity of the fact-finding process. In United States ex rel. Walden
v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240, 242 (7th Cir. 1965), an answer was given: "Where the rule
in question goes to the fairness of the trial, 'the very integrity of the fact-finding
process,' as the Supreme Court said in Linkleiter, retrospective application is called for,
since doubt is cast on the question of the defendant's guilt. In both Escobedo and
Mapp, however, the reliability of the evidence was not questioned; the attack was on
the admissibility of the evidence because it was obtained in violation of a fundamental
constitutional right." This statement suggests that a violation of a fundamental con-
stitutional right does not necessarily discredit the integrity of the fact-finding process.
The admission (or confession) obtained in an Escobedo situation, even though the
defendant's fundamental rights have been violated, is not necessarily unreliable. There-
fore, the defendant is not being denied a fair trial.
28 In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 377, 398 P.2d 380, 386-87, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 194-95
(1965), contends that the Escobedo rule was promulgated not "to undo the procedures
of yesterday, which despite their undesirability did not necessarily cause the conviction
of the innocent," but only "to discourage oppressive police practices" in the future.
29 Carrizosa v. Wilson, 244 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1965), admits that lack of
counsel at the accusatory stage allows an atmosphere in which confessions or admissions
may be elicited by police officers, and the court conceded that the defendant is, in effect,
on "trial" at this stage; consequently, the fairness of the subsequent trial may be
impinged upon. However, the court dismissed the fair trial issue by finding that al-
though the prohibition against the denial of counsel at the trial stage in Gideon v.
Wainwright, note 19 supra, was designed to afford the protection of a fair trial, the
Escobedo case could be distinguished in the following manner: "Since it is unlikely that
the mere denial of counsel at the accusatory stage, without more, was intended to have
the same effect as denial in a Gideon situation, whether Escobedo should be applied
retroactively depends on the applicability of the rationale of Linkletter to the purposes
underlying the Escobedo decision." Carrizosa v. Wilson, supra at 124.
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fundamental fairness of the criminal prosecution. 0 In the event that
the Court decides that the Escobedo rule does not affect the fairness
of the trial, then the disposition of a collateral attack will rest largely
on an application of the Linkletter elements.
Assuming that the purpose of the Eseobedo rule is determined to
be a deterrence of lawless police action in the interrogation room,31
then this element will have little weight toward applying the rule
retroactively. As pointed out in Linkletter, the police misconduct will
have already occurred and will not be corrected by releasing the
prisoners involved.32 Thus, the final determination should not de-
pend upon the purpose of the rule but upon a consideration of the
prior history and the ramifications which retroactive application will
have on the administration of justice.
The rule set forth in Escobedo was completely novel in that it had
not been voluntarily adopted by either the federal or state authori-
ties.83 However, the Escobedo rule could not be considered unfore-
seeable, owing to recent cases extending the protection of the sixth
amendment to the states. 4 Prior to Escobedo, no jurisdiction required
that the suspect be advised at the accusatory stage of his right to
remain silent or his right to have counsel, 35 and it was standard prac-
30 Roberts and Musmanno, JJ., dissenting in Commonwealth v. Negri, 34 U.S.L.
WEEK at 2187, recognized that the Escobedo rule was aimed at more than mere deter-
rence of police officials: "I must respectfully disagree that Escobedo is not entitled to
retrospective application . . . The Escobedo principle may indeed act as a protecting
deterrent against excesses in interrogations. But that, in my view, is not the sole pur-
pose of the rule. The rule seems to recognize--indeed seems to be particularly premised
upon-the possibility that in the absence of such a rule a coerced and unreliable con-
fession may be secured and may result in the conviction of an innocent defendant. That
possibility is not inherent in the Linkletter situation where the evidence is unquestion-
ably credible."
31 Carrizosa v. Wilson, 244 F. Supp. at 125, states that the Escobedo rule was de-
signed as a "prophylactic against coercion in the interrogation room."
32 381 U.S. at 637.
33 The Court in Escobedo recognizes that New York has a judicial rule excluding
a confession taken from a defendant during the investigative stages, after a specific re-
quest from his attorney to consult with the accused has been denied. People v. Donovan,
13 N.Y.S.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963). The Escobedo rule,
however, is broader, requiring police to advise the defendant of his rights. Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 486-87, 490-91.
34 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which extended the right of counsel
to indigent defendants in state criminal trials, and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964), where an indicted defendant under interrogation was given the right to be
advised of his rights to counsel and silence. See Winters, Counsel for the Indigent
Accused in Wisconsin, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1965), for a thorough review of right to
counsel decisions, a discussion of the problems solved and problems raised by those
decisions, and a consideration of the available alternatives in supplying counsel for the
indigent accused.
35 Compare Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357
U.S. 504 (1958) (companion case).
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tice not to advise the defendant of his rights until arraignment, 0
the preliminary hearing, 7 or indictment. 8 Thus, the reliance placed
upon the former state procedural rules by both the state courts and
the local law enforcement officers should weigh heavily in consider-
ing retroactive application 3 9
The effect on the administration of justice also points to a limita-
tion of the Escobedo rule to a prospective application. In view of
prior standard practices, the number of convictions obtained under
now wrongful procedures is left to the imagination, and it seems
safe to predict that retroactive application of the Escobedo rule
would result in a deluge 0 of challenged convictions by habeas corpus
or other appropriate applications. The ultimate result may often be
the release of the applicants, since retrials in many cases would not
be feasible.4 '
Contrary to the Es-obedo rule, the Griffin rule will more than
likely be evaluated in light of fundamental fair trial standards and,
consequently, may be applied retroactively. The grounds upon which
Griffin was argued encompassed the denial of the petitioner's right
to a fair fact-finding procedure.4" The purpose of the Griffin rule
was to prevent the prosecutor's comment from becoming a particle
36 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
37 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
38 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
39 Carrizosa v. Wilson, 244 F. Supp. at 126, states: "To apply Escobedo retroactively
'does nothing to punish the wrong-doing official [who at the time had no reason to
think his conduct was illegal] while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing
defendant.'" (Citing Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).)
40 Those defendants represented by counsel who plead guilty, however, are pre.
cluded from collaterally attacking their conviction because the plea itself is a conviction.
Thomas v. United States, 290 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Morin, 265
F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1959); Gonzales v. United States, 210 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1954);
United States v. Sturm, 180 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 986
(1950).
41 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 637-38.
42 380 U.S. at 614, the Court stated that permitting comment on defendant's refusal
to testify was equivalent to self-incrimination: "For comment on the refusal to testify
is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,' Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55, which the Fifth Amendment outlaws." Self-incrimination is
regarded as part and parcel of a fair trial in Holtzoff, The Relation Between the Right
to a Fair Trial and the Right of Freedom of the Press, 1 SYRAcusn L. Rtv. 369 (1950):
"The principal private rights guaranteed to the individual by the Constitution may be
enumerated as follows: . .. and finally, the right to a fair trial. The last mentioned
right has two aspects .... The second aspect... comprehends specific privileges in
respect to judicial procedure in criminal cases .... He may not be compelled to incrimi-
nate himself." Thus, comment on the defendant's refusal to testify should be regarded
as a denial of a fair trial in the sense that it impairs the integrity of the fact-finding
process.
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of evidence, 43 relieving the prosecution's burden of producing evi-
dence and influencing the jury's determination. Also the petitioner
in United States ex rel. Shott v. Tehan,44 now before the Supreme
Court, alleges that the prosecutor's comment constituted a violation
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 5 It
appears, then, that the Court will undertake to determine the fair
trial issue at the outset, and if it finds in fact that the integrity of
the fact-finding process has been contaminated, it will apply the
Griffin rule retroactively, 46 thereby eliminating the need to applythe
Linkletter test.
Should the Court decide that the Griffin rule does not go to assur-
ing the defendant a fair trial, an application of the Linkletter test
would raise a close question as to retroactive application. Although
it is difficult to determine what purpose the Griffin rule would have,
other than the protection of a fair trial, the California Supreme
Court commented on this element in the following manner:
Although the purpose of Griffin was not solely to deter future
comment or instructions in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
neither was Griffin directed to the correction of past errors to the
same degree as those cases which have been retroactively applied.
Certainly, the comment rule has not infected trials to the same
degree as those errors that the Supreme Court has cured retro-
actively ....
The error is not of the type that pervades the entire trial so as to
43 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. at 613 states: "It [comment rule] is in substance
a rule of evidence that allows the States the privilege of tendering to the jury for its
consideration the failure of the accused to testify. No formal offer of proof is made as
in other situations; but the prosecutor's comment and the court's acquiescence are
the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance."
44 337 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 381 U.S. 923 (1965) (seeking
retroactive application of the Griffin rule).
45 33 U.S.L. WEEK at 3373.
46 The Court in In re Gaines, 63 Adv. Cal. 235, 240, 404 P.2d 473, 476, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 865, 868 (1965), held that it would not apply the Griffin rule retroactively, even
though the prosecutor's comment does affect the fairness of the trial, unless the com-
ment has infected the trial to the same degree as those errors for which the Supreme
Court has already allowed retrospective application. Apparently the court in In re
Gaines did not believe that the prosecutor's comment went to the essence of the fact-
finding process although the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination
was violated. In connection with this argument, the same court in People v. Modesto,
62 Cal. 2d 436, 452-53, 398 P.2d 753, 762-63, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 426-27, stated that
the jury draws adverse reference from the defendant's failure to testify even though
there is no comment; therefore, any comment is merely harmless error, not requiring
reversal. In light of Mr. Justice Douglas' statement in Griffin, the California court's
argument does not appear to be persuasive: "What the jury may infer given no help
from the court is one thing. What they may infer when the court solemnizes the silence
of the accused into evidence against him is quite another." 380 U.S. at 614.
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deny due process and a fair trial such as was involved in Gideon v.
W~ainwright... and similar cases.
47
Applying the other elements of the Linkletter test, one finds that
the prior history reveals a justifiable reliance on limited comment
rules by some states,48 but one also finds a foreshadowing of the
Griffin rule .4  Furthermore, the justifiable reliance element is not as
substantial a contention as in Mapp or Escobedo because the six
states5" which permitted comment did not agree as to the extent of
allowable comment51 and, therefore, no common foundation existed
to which the states could point in reliance. Thus, in applying the
Linkletter test, the prior history and reliance element should be given
little weight in the final determination of whether the Griffin rule
should be limited to a prospective application.
In regard to the administration of justice, there is little doubt that
a retroactive application of Griffin would affect many convictions in
states such as California where comment has been a routine pro-
cedure.5 The six states which have allowed comment may be faced
with a flood of habeas corpus applications. Though not determina-
tive, this factor will probably influence the Court since it is usually
47 In re Gaines, 63 Adv. Cal. at 238-40. Apparently, the court is making a distinc-
tion between a violation of the accused's constitutional right which may offend our
sense of justice but does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process.
48 E.g., People v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 2d 478, 165 P.2d 3 (1946).
49 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), held that the self-incrimination clause of
the fifth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Malloy, decided only last year, overruled Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947),
and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
50 At the time Griffln was decided, 44 states had already adopted a "no comment"
rule. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. at 611-12 n.3.
51 Ibid. "Of the six states which permit comment, two, California and Ohio, give
this permission by means of an explicit constitutional qualification of the privilege
against self-incrimination. CAL. CoNsT., art. I, § 13; OHIO CONsT., art. I, § 10. New
Jersey permits comment, State v. Corby, 28 NJ. 106, 145 A.2d 289; cf. State v. Garvin,
44 N.J. 268, 208 A.2d 402; but its constitution contains no provision embodying the
privilege against self-incrimination (see Laba v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 23 N.J. 364,
389, 129 A.2d 273, 287; State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 168-69, 142 A.2d 65, 70). The
absence of an express constitutional privilege against self-incrimination also puts Iowa
among the six. See State v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 372-73, 283 N.W. 217, 223.
Connecticut permits comment by the judge but not the prosecutor. State v. Heno, 119
Conn. 29, 174 A. 181. New Mexico permits comment by the prosecutor but holds that
the accused is then entitled to an instruction that 'the jury shall indulge no presumption
against the accused because of his failure to testify.' N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-19;
State v. Sandoval, 59 N.M. 85, 279 P.2d 850."
52 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), affirming People v. Adamson, 27
Cal. 2d 478, 165 P.2d 3 (1946), which upheld CAL. CONsT., art. I, § 13, which
provides: "[I]n any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to
explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may




not feasible to have retrials of long-standing convictions and the
Court has indicated that it has no desire to effect the "wholesale
release" of prisoners where their guilt is not in question.53 Mr.
Justice Black's statement in Linkletter, however, is a reminder that
the Court should not and will not minimize the rights of the indi-
vidual:
No State should be considered to have a vested interest in keeping
prisoners in jail who were convicted because of lawless conduct by
the State's officials .... It certainly offends my sense of justice to
say that a State holding in jail people who were convicted by un-
constitutional methods has a vested interest in keeping them there
that outweighs the right of persons adjudged guilty of crime to
challenge their unconstitutional convictions at any time.54
How the Court will utilize the Linkletter test remains to be seen.
The Linkletter test does have its advantages. It has elaborated upon
a rather vague 1940 standard for retroactivity which was suggested
in Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank.5 The ele-
ments of the new test enable the Court to take cognizance of the real
procedural problems facing the courts and law enforcement officers.
The major disadvantage of the Linkletter decision is that the courts
may be too quick to apply its test without first evaluating the effect
the rule in question has on the fairness of the trial.
D. BROWNELL MOON, JR.
58 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 637.
54 Id. at 652-53 (dissenting opinion).
55 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940). That test was restated in Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. at 626: "Under our cases it appears ... that the effect of the invalidity attacked
is subject to no set 'principle of absolute retroactive invalidity' but depends upon a
consideration of 'particular relations ... and particular conduct... ; of rights daimed
to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality'; and
'of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application."'
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